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Abstract 
We present conceptual and empirical insights on the issue of resource taxation, an intrinsic regional 
environmental policy. It deals with the implementation of environmental taxes and environmental planning 
at regional level, as tools aimed at achieving weak sustainability for non renewable resources like 
aggregates, extracted for a diverse set of economic aims. We frame the discussion in the spirit of refreshing 
the need of ecological and resource tax reforms at national and regional level-. We do note and discuss the 
intrinsic peculiarities of resource taxes with respect to emission taxes, namely the integration with regional 
planning, the use of revenue for weak sustainability objectives, the different role by played technology and 
efficiency. Factors that are to be taken into account in any specific implementation. We empirically 
investigate resource taxation issues by focusing on aggregate extraction management and policy of two 
large Northern Italian regions, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. We conclude that the possible effects of 
extraction charges for the aggregate market development in Italy can be very limited. The level of charges 
is generally too low to be expected to have an effect on demand (through aggregate prices) and supply of 
aggregates. The environmental objectives of planning are, at least for the moment, other than reducing 
extraction, and they generally consist of minimising external impacts, to support sustainable management 
of landscapes, and to provide multi-value public goods within the local area. The evidence shows that even 
more for resource taxes a political economy analysis that encompasses institutional and planning issues is 
needed to effectively shape environmental policies. The complementarity of land use planning and 
economic instruments is a key driver of sustainability performances and witness reciprocal influences. The 
unintended effects of economic instruments are also a crucial thing for evaluating effectiveness and 
efficiency. Those include positive effects of ‘institutional kind’ on the governance and organizational 
performance of the integrated policy-planning framework. 
 
Keywords: Resource tax reforms, Aggregates, environmental charges, regional planning, sustainability, ex 
post compensations, Political economy, unintended effects, environmental federalism 







1. ECOLOGICAL TAX REFORMS, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Ecological tax reform (ETR) is an essential element in long-term sustainable growth/development and it 
will also help the EU to further strengthen its global leadership in the eco-efficient use of energy and 
resources. The current competitive advantage of the EU in terms of resource efficiency (Bleischwitz et al., 
2009), especially for carbon is on the one hand dependant on a stronger reaction to past oil crises, and on 
the other hand on a strategic decision of (northern) EU countries of implementing environmental policy 
(waste, pollution related) and green fiscal reforms (Scandinavia in early 90’s, UK), that have been 
completed and has supported green investments by private firms. A new emphasis on ETR is needed even 
in countries that had adopted them significantly, given recent evidence shows how the share of 
environmental tax revenue on GDP is decreasing (in real terms) in most countries. This may happen if 
taxes are not implemented in accordance to a pre defined ‘escalator’ or if inflation of high growth periods 
erodes the real value. Even in the UK, some taxes (climate change levy) were frozen in the past years and 
only projected to grow with inflation in the current years since 2007-2008. The current economic 
stagnation which mainly in the EU has persisted since 2008 provides a rationale for increasing such taxes 
from the very current low levels – decreasing in real terms since the 90’s - in the EU. The political 
acceptability of environmental taxes is still extremely low and the multiple static and dynamic gains for 
society are not effectively understood and communicated. Political economy analyses are needed on 
theoretical and applied grounds (Aidt, 2010). The way revenue recycling is designed and proposed 
matters in order to enhance the understanding of both economic and environmental values of ETR. 
Ecological tax reform represents an umbrella under which market-based instruments can be designed 
optimally and implemented coherently. Tax reform can contribute to a more sustainable healthy 
environment. A gradual shift of the tax base away from taxing ‘good resources’ such as investment and 
labour, towards taxing ‘bad resources’ such as pollution and inefficient use of energy, would also help to 
internalise external costs into service and product prices. This would in turn create more realistic market 
price signals. Similar conclusions have been reached by the OECD in their many publications on ETR, 
culminating in ‘The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes’. The Council of Ministers have 
also endorsed ETR in their recent review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy: ‘Member States 
should consider further steps to shift taxation from labour to resource and energy consumption and/or 
pollution, to contribute to the EU goals of increasing employment and reducing negative environmental 
impacts in a cost –effective way.’ (Review of the SD Strategy, Council of Ministers, 9 June 2006). 
According to Andersen and Ekins (2009) and Andersen et al. (2007), the implementation of carbon taxes 
and/or auctioned permits is a fruitful way to reconcile in this recession environmental and economic 
performances, where ETR can be shaped on a real ‘policy based’ target perspective: set up to finance 
specific EU (competiveness) aims. As debated in the rich discussion on the effects of Environmental Tax 
Reform (ETR) in the 90’s, double and triple dividends could emerge (Busquet, 2000).  
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The characteristics of the current economic crisis may be very appealing and favouring a more extended 
application of ETR, in both northern and southern EU countries. In fact, if the scale effect is trivially 
beneficial to the environment in the short run, the ultimate end of environmental policy is to target 
environmental efficiency and overall productivity of the economy in the long run, even ‘taking advantage’ 
of the crisis. A sustainable economy is thus a greener (and fairer) economy that increases its social and 
economic performances in the broadest meaning. The implementation of extensive ETR policies in this 
scenario is an effective way to coherently link short term (sustain economic growth through labor and 
income tax cuts) and long run objectives (sustainable economic and environmental growth, by reducing 
externalities, having prices reflecting relative scarcity of all resources, and inducing/financing resource 
efficiency through innovation). ETR can be targeted and tailored to those different but potentially 
complementary short and long term social needs.   
Thus a strong rationale for environmental fiscal policy emerges on the basis of the following joint 
elements: structurally Changing relative prices for higher resource efficiency with a medium long run 
perspective in mind (we refer to the ‘Resource efficiency roadmap launched by the EU in September 2011 
which presents as key word ‘Sustainable consumption and production and links to green fiscal reforms in 
the EU’), supporting Green investments to boost current cycle and rebalance future growth/ demand.    
Given that the opposition to fiscal measures from a political perspective has always mainly been rooted on 
the inflationary effects (and circumscribed costs accruing to certain parts of society that bear higher 
production costs, partly transferred to consumers), this economic situation is indeed unrepeatable in terms 
of political acceptability and macro economic necessity: deflation (EU prices will be increasing at around 
1.5% in 2013 back to 2009 levels). High unemployment and recession fears call for anti-inflationary 
expansionary measures (mainly at EU but also regional levels), and fiscal stimulus to economic growth. 
ETR can provide short and long term impacts to economic growth and welfare. 
Clinch and Dunne (2006) present clear discussion on Ireland of the difficulties of implementing ETR 
double dividends reforms (Patuelli et al., 2006) when economic growth and inflation are high and 
unemployment and public budget necessity are low. That is maybe the reason why after the emphasis in 
the early 90’s such reforms were frozen both by theoretical critical arguments and by an unfavourable 
macroeconomic environment. The current time is very favourable for ETR reforms at Eu or national and 
regional levels (Ekins et al., 2011). 
The paper begins with the case for ETR and then extends the discussion to more specific resource 
taxation reforms (RTR), namely taxes on resources such as waste, water, minerals, aggregates, a 
relatively and strangely – given its role in ‘environmental & natural resource economics field’ more 
neglected area of study, even though eminent scholars recently hold attention to resources (Baumol, 
2010). RTR are embedded within ETR and presents idiosyncratic features that we analyse, especially the 
complementarity with environmental planning and weak sustainability based policy. They can generate 
‘bottom up’ ETR reforms and stimulate at the same time regional development given their intrinsic 
relationships with ‘environmental policy decentralisation’ dynamics.   
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In anticipating some results, the papers concludes that after decades of partial failure of introducing Eu 
based environmental taxes (e.g. carbon taxes that were not introduced due to unanimity rules), resource 
taxation, that is intrinsically an issue which has to do with ‘environmental federalism’ and policy 
decentralisation, is possibly a new framework for green taxation reforms. Resource taxation can also spur 
the implementation of other taxes from bottom up. The rationale is strong. Even though scarcity itself is 
often not the primary issue, and as a consequence the political / social resistance could be a fact (e.g. 
among other examples, Scotland land planning can be at first sight not coherent with taxation given 
abundance of resources), the rationale for resource taxation is high when taking a broad sustainability 
perspective. Intended and unintended effects of such taxes matter. RTR highlight the role of 
environmental policy even if minor externalities are at stake. More important, they generate revenue - 
more than other taxes due to lower demand elasticity - which is needed to lower labour taxes, extending 
the rationale of revenue neutral reforms. We could witness regionally based RTR implemented by leading 
local actors (major regions). This is possible in many ‘federal’ EU states such as Germany, Spain, and 
Italy. As example, in Italy revenue neutral RTR could help lowering the fiscal wedge, by abating the ‘tax 
on economic activity’ (IRAP) which amounts to 30 billion€ and primarily funds the health system. 
Andersen et a. (2011) estimate that ETR in Italy – including the removal of environmentally harmful 
subsidies - may weight 35billions of € in 2015 (beginning with 8 billions in 2012). Within it, pollution and 
resource taxes, now amounting around 1 billion, may be increased to around 7-8 billions (0.5% of GDP). 
Paragraph 2 comments on the general rationale in support of RTR. Paragraphs 3 and4 circumscribe the 
discussion to the ‘aggregate’ resources and presents empirical evidence based on case studies on the 
Italian regional policy and planning framework. Paragraph 5 concludes.  
 
2. FROM ETR TO RESOURCE TAX REFORMS (RTR) – RATIONALE AND ISSUES IN RESOURCE TAXATION 
The section presents a conceptual discussion on resource tax reforms with a special emphasis on EU 
potential implementation. We claim that the rationale for investigating resource tax reforms in isolation 
from ETR in general terms is the different framework. We refer to ETC/SCP (2012) for a survey of the 
literature and an extended analysis of main figures of resource use and productivity. Among others, recent 
papers on resource taxation issues have appeared on the most consolidated theoretical side (Baumol, 2010; 
bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Boadway and Keen, 2009; Bretschger and Valente 2010; Groth and Schout, 2007; 
Garnaut, 2010; Pittel and Bretschger 2010), but also others that provide new empirical evidence on 
‘resource management’ and sustainability issues at local and global scales (Bornhorst et al., 2007; Harkness, 
2009; Hamilton et al., 2005; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Segal, 2011; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004), with 
insights on aggregates (Soderholm, 2011). Some of this papers take a political economy perspective into 
account (Dresner and Ekins, 2010; Ekins et al., 2009; Kolstadt and Wiig, 2009; van der Ploeg, 2010; 
Deroubaix and Leveque, 2006; Dresner et al., 2006) in their resource taxation proposals.   
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We note that framework that is relevantly coherent with a ‘political economy’ approach, where the analysis 
of externality generated by extraction (of water, soil, minerals) and related rents cannot be disjointed from 
reasoning around the distribution of rents capture and the reinvestment of rents. Efficiency reasoning 
(optimality of rents, optimality of extraction) are entangled with reasoning on effectiveness and 
distributional impacts (dividends) arising from the dynamic management of resources. The existence of 
rents as related to property rights on (land) resources make a political economy approach (opposed to a 
purely economics one) more robust. A capital based approach to sustainability (weak or strongly defined) is 
also a key pillar of such framework, enriched by issues of rent distribution and bargaining power of 
involved stakeholders over resource use (O’Connor, 2007). Summing up, efficiency and distributional issues 
should be brought together in a full dynamic scenario where the analyses of the ‘use’ of the resource (its 
extraction) and ‘the use of rents’ the reinvestments and its multiple aims are jointed. This perspective needs 
to take into account more than one paradigm on sustainability, both centred on natural capital and its 
services and functions to society but with different flavour and different weights attached to efficiency, 
effectiveness, distribution of value, political bargaining over resource value: Sustainability as non-
diminishing aggregate consumption (or societal utility) underpinned by natural capital, as in the 
neoclassical economics modelling conventions, and sustainability as a complex systems co-evolution 
engaging four major classes of organizational forms, the economic, biophysical, social and political spheres. 
The rationale for a resource tax reform (RTR) in the EU embedded in a more general ETR (Soderholm, 
2006), is highly motivated by the very low level of taxation in most countries on ‘land based’ resources such 
as waste, materials, water, and by the consequential low presence of substantial earmarking of revenues. 
Both pillars (higher taxes and earmarking) are key in the light of linking sustainability, in its aspects of 
optimality of use of resources and effectiveness of investments accruing from rents generation. Earmarking 
and rent capture/distribution is evidently the political economy side of this framework. Following Baumol 
(2010) in his re-visitation of the Cost disease under an environmental point of view, we can highlight that 
resource taxes are socially useful to rebalance the production costs in favour of environmental services 
based activity (vs manufacturing, energy and construction, which heavily depends on direct resource use), 
such as services offered by nature, environmental services supporting manufacturing, all activities with 
high labour/environmental capital content and thus exposed to rising cost prices. Resource taxation and its 
earmarking (subsidy) could tackle this critical point of society and economic development. Institutional 
challenge can help achieving sound sustainable development path inspired by rent taxation. How (efficacy), 
when (timing) and where (scope, aims) money are spent matters.  
When we apply the theoretical reasoning developed in the ETR literature to real world Resource taxation, 
some points should be kept in mind to understand the effective ‘political economy’ framework and the final 
effects and objectives of such taxes.  
Specific fields such as aggregate extraction, minerals are investigated. It is often the case that the focus is 
on ‘taxes on non renewable’ resources that pose the well known problem of (optimal) resource taxation for 
rents capture. Efficiency and distribution issues are analysed. Insofar extraction activity involves emission  
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production; resource tax could be aimed at internalising different externalities: emission and land use 
related to extraction. Static and inter temporal externalities should also be dealt with. Within a more 
general ETR, then, the need of applying diverse instruments could arise if objectives of environmental 
policy making are multiple. 
Rent capture and distributional issues, incentive based mechanisms and dynamic efficiency, interaction 
with other fiscal measures, comparison of efficiency and effectiveness associated with resource use and 
consumption based tools are among the main investigated issues. Dynamic issues are at the core of any 
reasoning around resource taxation.  
When we apply the theoretical reasoning developed in the ETR literature to real world Resource taxation, 
some points should be kept in mind to understand the effective ‘political economy’ framework and the final 
effects and objectives of such taxes. What it maybe lacks is a series of papers comprehensively describing 
the potential structure of a ‘resource tax reform’ as disentangled from ETR in general. 
 Specific fields such as aggregate extraction, minerals are investigated. It is often the case that the focus is 
on ‘taxes on non renewable’ resources that pose the well known problem of (optimal) resource taxation for 
rents capture. Efficiency and distribution issues are analysed. Insofar extraction activity involves emission 
production, resource tax could be aimed at internalising different externalities: emission and land use 
related to extraction. Static and intertemporal externalities should also be dealt with. Within a more 
genera ETR, then, the need of applying diverse instruments could arise if objectives of environmental 
policy making are multiple. 
Rent capture and distributional issues, incentive based mechanisms and dynamic efficiency, interaction 
with other fiscal measures, comparison of efficiency and effectiveness associated with resource use and 
consumption based tools are among the main investigated issues.  
 
3. A CASE STUDY ON AGGREGATE RESOURCE TAXATION 
3.1 THE ECONOMIC, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
The present section deals with the implementation of environmental taxes and environmental planning at 
regional level, as tools aimed at achieving weak sustainability for non renewable resources like aggregates, 
extracted for a diverse set of economic aims (figure 1). It is focused on two large Northern Italian regions, 
Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, that together account for over 12 million inhabitants and more than 22% 
of national GDP. The Italian aggregates industry is the fourth largest in Europe in terms of extraction, 
after Germany, Spain, and France. The focus on the two main regions depend upon pragmatic reasons (e.g. 
data availability, policy makers availability). One main aim is to compare the economic and institutional 
policy settings, and the eventual performances of the two natural resource ‘policy systems’. We mainly 
analyse the economic and institutional settings and the outcomes they generate by relying on the 
elaboration of data sources and other qualitative information derived from stakeholder’s interviews (namely 
policy makers, engineers, planners). Though some figures on aggregate extraction, charges and regional 
income are available for some years, other tools such as econometric analysis are not feasibly and robustly  
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implementable due to too a limited pool of data. The econometric analysis of aggregated drivers and policy 
analysis is scope for further research.   
The construction industry’s activities constitute the main driver of aggregates demand. Residential and 
non-residential constructions represent 55% of end usage. The other important sector is road construction 
(27%). Infrastructures account for less than 10% of the total. These shares are influenced by the different 
phases of the business and public investment cycles, as the implementation of the ambitious plans for 
infrastructural investments in Italy could work to increase total demand and also to shift the relative share 
in favour of infrastructures and roads. However, very large projects usually lead to the opening of so called 
‘temporary quarries’, which are specific to the project and supply most of its demand. Since 1997-98, Italy 
has experienced a very significant and extensive cycle of construction activity, both residential and non 
residential.  
In 2004, the Italian aggregates industry was composed of around 1.796 companies, representing around 
12% of the total for the UEPG countries. They operated across 2.460 sites, 9% of the European total. Data 
suggest that the average size of companies is smaller than the European average. Total estimated 
production is 358 million tons, 12,5% of the European total. This share shows that average production per 
site and per company in Italy is higher than the European average. Unlike in other UEPG countries, the 
greater part of production is represented by sand and gravel (220 million tons) not crushed rocks (135 
million tons). Italy accounts for 16% of total sand and gravel produced in the UEPG countries, which 
suggest its relative specialisation in these products. The amount of recycled aggregates produced is 
extremely low, 3 million tons, which represents only 2% of the UEPG total. Other national estimates for 
2004 indicate 3,7 million/tons. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The economic instrument in force in Italy is a charge per cubic metre of aggregate extracted. The 
application is highly decentralized. There is no common national rate, and every region can apply a 
different rate and in different ways at provincial and municipal levels. The revenue from the charges for the 
most part accrues to municipalities and should be earmarked for ‘compensatory investments’ in localities of 
quarrying activity. The charge on aggregates is only one element of the very complex planning, 
authorisation, and regulation system related to quarrying activities prevailing in Italy; thus analysis of the 
effectiveness of aggregate charges cannot be performed in isolation from the other features and working of 
the administrative system.  
This country study on Italy is based on the original reconstruction of data and information from 
interviews with industrial actors and public officers involved in the aggregates industry. Probably because 
of the very decentralised administrative system related to the quarrying of aggregates, national level 
records of quantities extracted, industry turnover and production costs, market prices, international trade,  
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breakdown of end-uses, and of other key economic variables are not comprehensive. In contrast, in terms 
of the number and location of individual quarries, and their features, planned and actual aggregates 
extraction, charges and other variables at the local level (regions, provinces, municipalities) information is 
extremely detailed. However, this detailed information has not been integrated into country-level 
databases, regular reports, or general studies. The current case study takes a general country-level 
perspective to the extent allowed by the information available and develops some specific in-depth analyses 
of extraction activities and their administration at the regional/provincial level, including the specific role 
of extraction charges. Analyses derive from both qualitative approaches (interviews to experts in private 
and public sectors) and quantitative examinations of some datasets we originally reconstructed from 
official sources 
The economic instrument applied in Italy is a charge per cubic metre of aggregates extracted. There is 
neither a common rate nor a minimum/maximum rate established at the national level. Regions can apply 
different rates based on different features within the complex planning and authorisation framework 
described below2.  
The Analyses of two major regions (Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, that account for barely 30-35% of 
Italian GDP and 15 millions of people), which we take in this section as leading case studies, highlight the 
economic and institutional framework summarised below .  
In Lombardy, The right to exploit quarries belongs to the owner of the site, who is authorised by the 
Province to exploit it. The authorisation is conditional on the signing of an agreement between the 
applicant and the Municipality/Municipalities involved. The agreement should follow the guidelines 
prepared by the Regional Council3. Through the agreement, the applicant agrees to certain conditions. 
a)  To pay an annual extraction charge to the Municipality, in order to cover some of the costs of 
rehabilitation of the areas directly or indirectly affected by the exploiting activities.  
b)  The fee is proportional to the type and amount of material extracted in a year, in compliance with the 
tariffs fixed by the Regional Council. 
c)  The Regional Council is required to fix: (i) the amount to be paid to cover the expenses related to the 
evaluation of the application; (ii) the charge for exploitation rights, which is based on the commodity 
sectors and the amount of extracted materials (except for ornamental stone, where the tariff applies to 
commercialised materials). Municipalities allocate 15% of the above-mentioned sums to the Province, 
which can use them for the rehabilitation and improvement of areas affected. 
                                                            
2 A detailed analysis of the legislation on aggregates and quarrying in Italy, not presented here, is available upon 
request.  
3 The agreement is in Italy a private law contract between two parties, wherein the municipality operates as an 
intermediary. It is a bargaining process wherein the municipality may play its part in order to maximise its benefits 
The inclusion in the bargaining of side payments that increase the total cost and are aimed at funding for 




d)  If the extractive activities take place (even partially) within the boundaries of a regional park, a fee (not 
higher than 1/3 of the charge) must be paid to the park’s managing body, in order to cover a part of the 
costs involved in rehabilitation of the areas surrounding the quarry. 
e)  The applicant must, at his own expense and before the closure of the quarry, carry out any 
rehabilitation work necessary to make the area suitable for the re-use foreseen in the provincial plan, 
according to the conditions specified in the agreement. 
The mechanism in Emilia Romagna is also based on the rights of the site owner and the authorisation to 
excavate4, which is conditional upon the signing of an agreement between the applicant and the appropriate 
Municipality. The agreement is based on the guidelines prepared by the Regional Council. In signing this 
agreement, the applicant commits: (a) to carry out any work that is necessary to connect the quarry to the 
public road; (b) to carry out any work that is necessary to prevent damage to other goods/activities; (c) to 
correctly implement the exploitation plan; (d) to carry out any work necessary for site rehabilitation; (e) to 
pay an annual charge to the Municipality. This charge is aimed at covering some of the costs arising from 
public works additional to those mentioned above. Municipalities must allocate 20% and 5% respectively of 
the fee to the relevant Province and Region5. The Regions and Provinces may use these sums for 
rehabilitation and improvements to add value to the areas affected by the quarrying activities and for 
planning, monitoring, and research related to extraction activities. In practice, there is no binding law 
requirements; the revenues have generally be used to cover for additional administrative expenses 
including direct and indirect monitoring activities.  
The level of the charge in Emilia Romagna since its introduction in 1991-1992 has been between 0,46€ and 
0,57€ per cubic meter extracted (see Table 2a for more detail). The Municipality can add other costs within 
agreements to bring the total cost of exploitation to around 1€ per cubic metre. Emilia Romagna is now 
examining and revising charges and new levels should be set for 2007 (see below)6. According to regional 
level policy makers, there should be economic incentives which differentiate the tax levied according to the 
land’s (ecological) value. This ecological value is already estimated as part of the planning procedures. A 
differentiated tax could integrate some recognition of the heterogeneity in land use and values, 
complementing a preliminary stage of (economic) evaluation with a consequential stage where price 
mechanisms play a role.  
 
Tables 1- 2-3 here 
 
                                                            
4 This lasts on average 5 years.  
5 The regional share of the tax revenue was 554.106€ in 2006, representing 5% of the total revenue derived from the 
aggregate tax.  
6 2007 sees the first updating of aggregate charges since their introduction in 1991. The revision is likely to be based 
on past inflation, in order to restore levels to 1991 real term values. See Table 2.  
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In their present configuration, extraction and other charges are designed to cover the (presumed) direct 
and indirect costs of land resource modifications induced by quarrying. In principle, Italian charges are 
aimed at maintaining the ‘natural capital’ in the quarry location area. However: (a) the costs reflected in the 
fee are not established through a specific ‘natural capital’ calculation, and they are slow to come through 
because of the lengthy administrative processes; (b) while the results of the restoration charges (after 
closure) are visible, how the extraction charge revenues are used by local administrations requires 
monitoring. Available information also indicates that, in the contractual agreements with quarry owners, 
Municipalities often ask for finance for activities not linked to land preservation.  
The charge is not aimed at controlling and regulating the quantities extracted; these are established by the 
Provincial quarrying plans. In both Emilia Romagna and Lombardy there is a trend towards limiting the 
opening of new quarries and exploiting existing ones more efficiently.  
The fee also is not designed to create incentives for recycling and substitution of recycled aggregates or 
C&D waste for virgin aggregates. According to bills, charges must be earmarked for ex post compensation. 
Actually, compensation is paid through a “market” bargaining process and is effectively on top of the tax 
paid by municipalities and operators. The actual tax is constituted by a formal charge levied by provinces 
and municipalities, and an informal charge which is open to bargaining at local level, which is used to 
finance local public goods and compensate for full environmental externalities from quarrying activities.  
 
 
3.2 Evidence from Italian case studies  
3.2.1 Revenues from aggregates charges  
Based on the charges per ton levied in the regions of Emilia Romagna and Lombardy (around 0,31 €/ton, 
or 0,46-0,57 €/m3), a total extracted quantity of 358 million tons of aggregate in Italy represents a total 
charge value of 110 million€7. The additional costs related to the compensatory investments demanded by 
municipalities are difficult to estimate. Information from interviews suggests that these extra charges can 
double the initial charge, thus suggesting total revenues of 220 million€. The estimated turnover of the 
aggregates industry in Italy is around 2,2 billion € (ANEPLA, 2003). Extraction charges can represent 
around 5% of total turnover, and charges plus other costs can be as much as 10% of total turnover.  
Even the distribution of charge revenue among the various institutions varies from region to region, 
making a country-wide picture impossible. In the province of Bologna (capital of Emilia-Romagna) the 
sharing of an estimated total revenue of 1,5 million/€ is: 75% to the Municipality, 20% to the Province 
(estimated amount 300.000€), 5% to the Region. This revenue is generally used for restoration of closed 
quarry sites (in the past many sites were not fully restored by the owners) and for general land 
                                                            
7 For comparison, the estimated revenue in France is around 50-60 million/€ .  
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conservation purposes. In a region such as Emilia-Romagna the total revenue can be around 10-15 
million/€. 
In short, the economic and financial burden of the extraction charges seems to be a relatively small, 
although not negligible, as a component of the industry production costs. It is unlikely that quantity 
decisions are taken based on savings on extraction charges. Even demand for new quarries seems to be 
barely influenced by these charges.  
Another critical issue for social costs and conservation of natural capital is site restoration after quarry 
closures. Although progress is being made, it is difficult to get an overall picture of the quality of the 
rehabilitation that takes place. Various public officials and environmental managers that were interviewed 
felt strongly that the quality of site restorations must now be a key priority. However, the available figures 
on site restoration do not show clear evidence of innovative trends. Table 4 shows the mix of after-closure 
restoration categories in the Province of Bologna for 1990-2005. In fact, agricultural exploitation of former 
quarries, generally associated with lower environmental value, tends to dominate over other options which 
could perhaps provide wider public good benefits. According to policy makers in the sector, options such as 
forestation, creation of wetlands, lakes and reservoirs should be prioritised in planning scenarios. The aim 
is to increase the compensation in total value terms as far as possible, even perhaps over-compensating for 
the damage resulting from quarrying activities. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
3.2.2  EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS: EXTRACTION CHARGES, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MARKETS 
The two cornerstones of policy on aggregates in Italy are: (a) planning/regulation of quarrying activities, 
and (b) extraction charges. The latter do not have the explicit aim of either reducing the quantities 
extracted or increasing the amounts of aggregates and C&D waste that is recycled. Extraction charges are 
mainly intended to ‘compensate’ for external land use costs arising from quarrying activities. In addition to 
extraction charges other costs may arise as a result of the agreements between site owners and 
municipalities, which could be up to double the amount of the basic extraction charge. A relatively small 
extraction charge thus renders these additional costs more economically sustainable.  
It can be claimed that the Italian approach is based on a mix between keeping a stable level of ‘natural 
capital’ and compensating the local community for any disturbance or loss of amenities by investing in the 
area surrounding of quarrying activities. Also, the legal obligation of rehabilitating the areas around closed 
down quarries is coherent with the principle of maintaining an ‘almost’ constant natural capital (‘weak 
sustainability’ rule). Unlike other countries, Italy does not see the quantities of materials extracted as 
themselves being the source of environmental damage. In addition, quarrying policy does not reflect the 
principles of optimal consumption of scarce non-renewable resources, in which pricing plays a key role by  
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preventing inter-temporal negative externalities. Externalities are seen mainly in terms of changes to the 
local environment and landscape, and the economic instrument is mainly compensatory in nature.  
In general, the planning of quarrying activities seems to be based on the same principles as land 
conservation and minimisation of natural capital losses. Extraction is allowed to keep pace with demand, 
and the scarcity of aggregates is not prioritised; however, resource exploitation should fulfil sustainability 
rules8. Planning has generally addresses the preventive side to these sustainability objectives, but the 
approach is changing. During the last few years, the approach of planners has shifted from allowing small 
and shallow extraction for short period over large areas of land, to allowing a few deeper sites involving 
less surface areas. In short, a few deeper, better managed mines are considered preferable to several 
shallower, less well exploited mines. This confirm the idea that the ‘surface externalities’ related to 
quarrying sites, including the transportation networks, are considered to be more important than those 
associated with intensive exploitation9.  
Planning does have an influence on quarrying activity (quantities) that is: (a) linked to the development of 
demand but is lagging behind it due to the slowness of the planning process; (b) based on caps on total 
quantities extracted that are related to the sustainability of local land resources and conservation; and (c) 
the imposition of higher rehabilitation costs.  
The specific role of aggregates extraction planning is complemented by a very complex set of 
legislation/regulation on (a) land use and (b) waste.  
The first area of legislation (land use and planning) contributes to limiting the quantitative development of 
quarrying activity and to increasing its explicit and implicit costs. However, the very ‘local’ nature of the 
activity gives Municipalities a significant and arbitrary role in the actual development of aggregates 
quarrying, including the nature of the ‘compensatory’ investments required of quarry owners, the actual 
earmarking of the revenue from the extraction charges, and the land rehabilitation operations when the 
quarry is abandoned.  
The second area (waste) acts instead in a more complex way. On the one hand, it works as an indirect 
support for quarrying activity by limiting the development of recycling for mining/quarrying and C&D 
waste. Although the application of s o m e  p r o v i s i o n s  ( e . g  ‘ g r e e n  p u blic procurements) could lead to 
significant developments, current recycling developments are very poor. On the other hand, the increasing 
limitations on waste landfills, including the enormous amount of C&D waste, and the application of a 
                                                            
8 This view is consistent with Kellett (1995) who stresses that potential resources are massive and prices are low 
compared to other minerals. The real issue is not scarcity per se, but the environmental costs linked with extraction, 
within a wide geographical perspective that takes account of interregional and inter country spillovers through the 
trading if aggregates: “it is not resource depletion which is the key issue but the environmental impact of resource 
exploitation” (Kellett, 1995, p. 575). 
9 In ER, authorisations for extractions usually apply to a period of 5 years. 4 of these are to be devoted to mining and 
the fifth to rehabilitation of the site (i.e. creation of grassland, wetland, tree planting). In practice, some rehabilitation 
(i.e. tree planting) begins in parallel with excavation activity (i.e. tree planting).    
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landfill tax since the mid-1990s, could drive the development of recycling to produce substitute for virgin 
aggregates. Even in this case, however, the evidence suggests that these effects would be very limited in 
the short term.  
In other words, planning in terms of quantities, seems clearly to be more important than extraction 
charges for shaping the development of aggregates supplies in Italy. From the information available and 
the interviews with stakeholders it is clear that material extraction is inelastic to prices, and taxes/charges, 
and that extraction charges are low relative to the total value of the materials extracted: 1 cubic metre has 
a market value of 8-9€, compared to a charge of 0,31 €/m3. Even it the other payments to municipalities 
are included the cost rises only to a maximum of 0,6 €/m3. On the other hand, demand for aggregates 
seems to be inelastic to price and also to extraction charges when translated into the market price of 
aggregates.  
In one of the regions we examined (Emilia-Romagna), when the charge was established in 1991 its level 
was relatively high, probably the highest in Italy at the time. The idea was to implement a real fiscal 
environmental tool aimed at making an impact on materials extraction through prices. Policy makers later 
recognised that price instruments were less effective than planning mechanisms, which are now at the heart 
of policy relating to the aggregates sector. In Emilia Romagna, the new charge, to be introduced in 
2006/2007, is just an update of the old one, taking account of inflation over the past decade. It is worth 
noting that higher taxes and stronger policies may bring about detrimental side effects they might even 
lead to more illegal extractions, and/or more imports from neighbouring regions or abroad (where 
regulations is less stringent) thus exporting environmental effects that may be higher or lower in value 
depending on specific circumstances (see above). This matters if sustainability is conceived as a regional / 
European issue, not merely national. Tables 5 and 6 summarise the main findings of the case studies that 
offer scope for generalisation. Table 5 highlights the complementary role of charges and regional planning, 
with a focus on the intended and unintended effects. 
 
Tables 5,6 here 
 
4. MAIN OUTCOMES FROM THE AGGREGATE EXTRACTION CHARGE ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis through case studies and interviews to main stakeholders shows some main 
outcomes. Extraction charges to aggregates in Italy are not primarily aimed at reducing the quantity 
extracted nor at promoting the recycling of extractive/mining and C&D waste. It is instead aimed at 
contributing to reducing the external costs of quarrying activities by financing local land conservation 
investments by municipalities and other institutions that receive a share of the charge revenues, the bulk of 
which goes to the municipalities.  
Therefore, the effect of the charge on quantities extracted, or conservation of the resource in the ground, 
cannot be used as a direct dimension for evaluating this policy. However, extraction charges could affect the  
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aggregates market, and this effect could be an important dimension of policy evaluation, which, however, 
is about an ‘unintended effect’ on reducing extraction and developing recycling. The key ‘effectiveness question’ 
refers to the actual use of the revenue for compensation of landscape alterations, destruction of amenities, 
and other local impacts of quarrying activity.  
In terms of the role of charges in the aggregate market, we conclude that the effects are very limited. 
Despite the variety of situations caused by the very decentralised management of the charge across 
provinces/municipalities, the level of charges is generally too low to be expected to have an effect on 
demand (through aggregate prices) and supply of aggregates. Also the stability of nominal charges over 
time contributes to their limited efficacy in the production costs of the aggregates quarrying industry.  
Markets mechanisms, and in particular construction investments, are actually the main drivers of demand 
for extraction/production. On the supply side, production is mainly controlled by provincial level planning 
of quarrying and extraction. Quantity extraction planning tends to be in line with forecast demand, and 
defines supply ceilings accordingly. In addition, the true objectives of current planning are generally 
sustainable management of landscapes and multi value public goods.  
The result is that the elasticity of aggregate supply to demand can be limited at the local level, in 
particular in times of favourable business cycles for constructions. This general rigidity, however, is 
compensated for by flexibility in procurements inside the economically feasible area (about 30-50 km), by 
flexibility in the timing of extractions within the total capacity of single quarries (extraction anticipations 
and delays within allowed limits), by some limited import flow from nearby countries, and by price 
increases (even if elasticity of demand to prices is low which means that the quantities demanded are 
hardly affected).  
The still poor working of the recycling loop for C&D waste in Italy despite recent favourable 
developments, and the preference for virgin materials by the construction industry, combine to make 
aggregates recycling marginal and not a true alternative to virgin aggregates. Also, the relatively low 
extraction charges, do not work in favour of recycling. Specially designed policies and taxes on landfill 
would do more to promote recycling. It is worth noting that a drawback of ‘environmental policy 
decentralisation is the increasing gap (divide) between regions. The ‘flexibility’ and coherence with local 
preferences (Oates theorem) of regional implementation of public good provision can exacerbate 
performance gaps. Both ‘mean’ and ‘variance’ of environmental performances are relevant to assess a 
country’s experience. As example, the Italian huge divide in recycling performance – that favours the 
North - is correlated with the adoption of ‘new waste policies’ – more intense  in the North as well 
(Mazzanti et al., 2012).     
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
We present conceptual and empirical insights on the issue of resource taxation, an intrinsic regional 
environmental policy. The political economy approach to resource taxation is defined by the necessity to 
cope with various issues (externality of extraction, resource efficiency, recycling, damage compensation,  
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site requalification) in a way that is related to both efficiency (without optimality)10 and effectiveness 
objectives. What mainly distinguishes Resource from other environmental taxes is in the end the two key 
interrelated issues of (i) rent management (ii) regional environmental planning actions. The two spill over 
the typical aims of environmental policy instruments and define a political economy framework where 
various elements f efficiency, effectiveness and distribution (of rents) matter for the achievement of 
economic and environmental targets. The complementarity between economic instruments and planning is 
of special interest and importance.    
The paper specifically deals with the implementation of environmental taxes and environmental planning 
at regional level, as tools aimed at achieving weak sustainability for non renewable resources like 
aggregates, extracted for a diverse set of economic aims. We frame the discussion in the spirit of 
refreshing the need of ecological and resource tax reforms at national and regional level-. We do note and 
discuss the intrinsic peculiarities of resource taxes with respect to emission taxes, namely the integration 
with regional planning, the use of revenue for weak sustainability objectives, the different role by played 
technology and efficiency. Factors that are to be taken into account in any specific implementation. One 
important point that emerges from the analyses is that more than with externality problems and real 
scarcity, we cope with weak sustainability objectives, namely the necessity of setting up (bargaining over) 
social compensations paid by the ‘exploiter of the resource’ (e.g. the owner of the quarry excavation right) 
through various means (abating labour taxes, providing local public goods, generating in situ 
environmental compensations). Indirect effects of policies are relevant as well in this ‘institutionally 
minded’ political economy approach.  
At a conceptual level, we may affirm that there are some structural differences that deserve attention when 
we move the reasoning on concepts and implementation of ETR from emission taxes to resource based 
taxes. First, in some (most?) cases we face a striking difference between pollution externality and resource-
based externality and scarcity. Given that scarcity is often not the priority issue (materials and resources 
are abundant), key issues are the sustainable management of extraction and the possibility that large 
differences in environmental taxation between not very distant regions/countries could drive trade. This 
is in itself not detrimental, but could generate hot spots and extraction to happen in less regulated 
environments, wherein compensatory mechanisms are not institutionalised. Global environmental effects 
of extraction may increase as a consequence. Second, price elasticity might be low. This means that you 
could be forced to massively increase prices if you wanted to ‘reduce’ extraction. This action would 
privately cost very much with probably low public gains in sustainability. Third, then, sustainability is a 
consequence driven more by ‘compensation’ effects (in a weak fashion of that sustainable development 
                                                            
10 We observe that the ‘efficiency without optimality’ concept, associated to the implementation of economic 
instruments is a reasonable assumption that also derives from the seminal contribution by Baumol and Oates (1988). 
The charges and standards approach says that setting a sufficient variety of environmental policies can contribute to 
the efficiency of a program for controlling externalities, and this is more relevant the higher the social costs are. A 
satisfying procedure that does not search for the global optimum can approach the least cost solution related to a 





(SD)) than by ‘pollution reduction’. Extraction and its ancillary negative social effects should be at least 
compensated for, and further they could be over compensated (through private and public goods provision 
to local communities and society as large). This is exactly what SD is about: giving new generations more 
capital stocks than the present one, in quality and quantity terms. Weak sustainability seems the ideal 
framework for reasoning around resource tax implementation at least when dealing with materials 
(though even other resources, such as water, are not strictly characterised by absolute scarcity and risk of 
depletion). 
The aggregate analyses has demonstrated that the case is here different from a policy approach aimed at 
discouraging extraction through price-based mechanisms (tax). Extraction is based on demand growth but 
under conditions that minimise the impact on land resources. This constraint, in theory, could produce 
severe limitations on extraction activities depending on the choices made by local planners. The key 
incentives consist of the internalisation of local external costs in the cost structures of extraction activities. 
This approach seems to encompass a ‘weak sustainability’ rule, according to which reduction in natural 
capital due to quarrying is compensated for by investments in natural capital in the surrounding areas, and 
investment is internalised in production costs through the charges levied (we refer to the EEA, 2008 
report ‘Effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in 
selected EU countries, report n.2, Copenhagen: European Environmental Agency, and the 2007 draft 
country report ‘aggregate taxes in Italy’) 11.  Tax implementation, institutional improvements, and 
planning. When dealing with resources, environmental planning plays a key role. This is mostly true in 
cases such as aggregate taxes and similar situations. The resource tax may have indirectly and positively 
affect the policy and market environment through institutional improvements: valuable resources before 
given away for free emerge. Economic values drive better management and planning, including 
monitoring of activities due to the tax imposition and tax collections. A key factor is the monitoring and 
quantification of flows that followed the introduction of the tax before which there was only qualitative 
evaluation of quarries. Thus, we would argue that a resource tax may contribute to better environmental 
performance through complementarity effects with other policy/economic factors, such as planning and ex 
post compensation schemes12.  More specifically, we would suggest that the dynamic interplay between 
                                                            
11 “A balance needs to be struck between the theoretical rhetoric of sustainable development and the commercial 
realities faced by the minerals industry” (Kellett, 1995, p. 572). Kellett is in favour of a “loose” definition of 
sustainability, that allows a movement towards a more sustainable basis for policy through a combination of recycling 
of aggregates and reductions in the amount of primary aggregates extracted each year.  
12 “the lack of recognition that high quality restoration is a positive element of a sustainable policy and as such should 
be distinguished from, day to day issues such as control over noise, dust and vibration plays down a genuinely credible 
sustainable aspect of the latest policy advice”, and “ local plan policies on aggregates need to be written specifically 
with sustainability issues in mind. Thus the central issue should be the balance between environmental quality before 
working commences and after restoration is complete. Issues of demand management and the localization of supply 
may be relevant to the realization of policies. Control over working to protect local populations form nuisance will 
remain a central theme in mineral plans bit it is not directly related to sustainability. Finally resource depletion issues 




taxes and planning can be described as follows. If taxes reduce extraction levels through direct and 
indirect effects at time T, then future planning rounds at times T+1,2.. May take this into account and 
reduce authorized extracted material per value added (more efficiency overall should be the aim of future 
planning). Taxes are important, but their effects need to be integrated within a complementarity 
framework, with other instruments. The generated revenue, which is likely to be substantial, may then be 
recycled and earmarked to compensatory environmental or public good based projects and/or to society 
for other aims (labour tax cuts as well as in core ETR). The matter is in the end probably more one of 
capturing and managing the rents society owns from a collective natural resource, and reinvesting such 
rents (in a Hartwick’s rule kind of fashion and in accordance to Genuine saving accounting, which poses 
the basis for economic-environmental sustainability) rather than using prices to internalise externality in a 
common fashion. Managing properly rents exploitation is a key economic-environmental issue along such 
line of reasoning. Rents finance investments in various (new) forms of capital: compensate or create new 
natural capital, substitute human and technological capital for natural capital. 
We show in the analysis that unintended effects are crucial for effectiveness assessments. In addition to 
making the institutional system more robust, by strengthening monitoring, data collection, in sectors like 
construction RTR can reduce tax evasion overall. A more transparent data collection, driven by the 
necessity to apply charges, can produce evident side b e n e f i t s  i n  a  s e c t o r  t h a t  i s  q u i t e  a f f e c t e d  b y  
illegal/black market elements. RTR might increase re use of materials (though the resource is not always 
scarce we avoid new sites by closing loops). Overall, the environmental land use planning itself can benefit 
from resource tax implementation due to their complementarity and the overall functioning of the policy 
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Table 1. Extraction charges in Lombardy  
Tariff/fee per cubic metre of extracted material*  Category 
2001-2002  2004-2005 
I Sand and gravel  0,387 €  0,41 € 
II Clay  0,439 €  0,47 € 
III Peat  1,34 €  1,42 € 
IV Ornamental stone  3,10 €  3,28 € 






VI Crushed stone (including residual material)  0,387 €  0,41 € 
* The tariff applies to the volume of extracted material except for ornamental stone, where it applies to tradable materials. 
Sources: Decree of the Regional Council VII/320 of 23rd October 2001, as modified by in 2002 and Decree of the Regional Council 
VII/1090 of 27th  October 2004. 
 
Table 2. Extraction charges in Emilia-Romagna (1991-2007) 
Group I: extracting materials for constructions  €/m3 
Sands and gravels from alluvial deposits  0,57 
Extracting materials from the mountains  0,465 
Other materials extracted from alluvial deposits  0,465 
Extracting materials from “marnoso–arenacea” formations   0,258 
Group II: extracting materials for industrial use  €/m3 
limestones and marls  0,52 
sands for industrial use  0,57 
clays for bricks  0,465 
Clays for ceramics  0,52 
Gypsum 0,57 
Group III: Ornamental stone  €/m3 
Ornamental stone  0,258 






























Sands and gravel 
(alluvial deposits)  0,75 0,41  0,62  0,46  0,59  0,25  0,85 
Clay 0,50  0,47 0,52  0,21  0,35  0,25  0,78 
Materials from 
mountains  0,50 0,41  0,36  0,46  0,70  0,35  0,78 
Gypsum 0,50  Not  available  0,36 0,39 0,29 Not  available  0,85 
 
  Not available  Not available  0,26 0,28 0,35 0,30  0,39 
 
Table 4- Province of Bologna: Site restorations categories 
 
Typology of quarry site restoration/ex post use of the site  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Partial site covering with agricultural use   15%  14%  15%  15% 
Total site covering with agricultural use  33%  33%  30%  33% 
Lake creation for recreation use  1%  1%  0%  1% 
Lake creation for multiple uses  5%  5%  9%  5% 
Restoration with agricultural use and vegetation setting  23%  20%  12%  23% 
Forestry 22%  25%  27%  22% 
Total site covering with forestry  0%  1%  2%  0% 
Total site covering with functional restoration  0%  0%  2%  0% 
River water basin expansion  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Wetland creation  2%  2%  4%  2% 
Total number of site restoration in the Province  131  117  124  117 






         Figure 1. Main sectors of aggregates demand in Italy 
 
           Source: ANEPLA 
 
 
Table 5. Assessment of the causality hypotheses on the charge instrument and planning 
 
Instrument Intended  effects  Evidence Unintended  effects  Evidence 
Charge ⇒  Revenue for investments 
compensating for ‘external 
costs’ 
Limited, mixed about 
earmarking of revenues and 
quality of investments 
Dispersion of financial 
resources out of the land 
resource sectors 
Limited  
Charge ⇒     - ΔExtraction  Strong: No 
effects 
Charge ⇒     + Δ Recycling  Strong: No 
effects 
Charge ⇒     + Δ Substitutes  Strong: No 
effects 
Charge ⇒     + Δ Import  Strong: 
Limited 
effects 
Planning ⇒  Limitation of extracted 
quantities 
Strong: Significant effects  Arbitrariness of local-level 
decisions 
Limited 
Planning ⇒  Limitation of quarrying areas   Strong: Significant effects  Arbitrariness of local-level 
decisions 
Limited 
Planning ⇒  Minimum impact on land 
resources 
Limited, depending on local 
administrations (see charge)
  
Planning ⇒  Remediation/restoration after 
closure 
Limited, mixed about 

























Table 6 - Main findings 
1.  The activities of the construction industry 
are the main driver of demand. Since the 
late 1990s, Italy has experienced a 
significant expansion in construction 
investments. The domestic supply of 
aggregates has expanded correspondingly 
and average prices have increased during 
the last few years.  
2.  Extraction charges are not primarily aimed 
at reducing the quantity extracted or at 
promoting recycling of extraction/mining 
and C&D waste. Rather, their purpose is to 
contribute to compensate for the external 
costs associated with quarrying activities 
through financing land conservation 
investments implemented by municipalities  
3.  the effects of extraction charges on 
aggregate market development in Italy are 
very limited. The level of charges is 
generally too low to have any effect on 
demand or supply of aggregates. Moreover, 
the stability in these nominal charges over 
time has contributed to their limited effect 
on quarrying costs.  
4.  The use of recycled aggregates is low level 
due to the still poor working of the 
recycling loop for C&D waste in Italy and 
the preference of the construction industry 
for virgin materials. In addition, the low 
level of extraction charges does not 
encourage recycling. Reformed Landfill 
taxes and policies related to C&D and 
quarrying waste could be significant in 
promoting recycling.  
5.  indirect effects should be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the overall 
effects of the introduction of aggregate 
taxes. The most important effect of charges 
on extraction activities is linked to 
monitoring, because following their 
introduction, new issues have emerged: 
6.  there has been a small reduction in the 
amounts of aggregate extracted, but in 
other respects there have been real 
improvements in the sector, both on the side 
of the public authorities and the market 
including  a reduction in the number of 
operating quarries, major improvements in 
the use of materials, higher aggregate prices 
and better use being made of it  
7. As a consequence of the legal rules being enforced and the public authorities operating more 
efficiently, aggregate taxes, combined with good planning procedures, good project evaluation and 
serious monitoring, there has been a positive evolution in the field of aggregate extraction. Overall, the 
combination of direct and indirect effects linked to planning, monitoring and agent behaviour described 
above have generated multiple improvements in the way the system works in terms of efficiency, 
environmental performance, and quality  
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